Pet Rodents and Fatal Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis in Transplant Patients by Amman, Brian R. et al.
In April 2005, 4 transplant recipients became ill after 
receiving organs infected with lymphocytic choriomenin-
gitis virus (LCMV); 3 subsequently died. All organs came 
from a donor who had been exposed to a hamster infected 
with LCMV. The hamster was traced back through a Rhode 
Island pet store to a distribution center in Ohio, and more 
LCMV-infected hamsters were discovered in both. Rodents 
from the Ohio facility and its parent facility in Arkansas 
were tested for the same LCMV strain as the 1 involved 
in the transplant-associated deaths. Phylogenetic analysis 
of virus sequences linked the rodents from the Ohio facility 
to the Rhode Island pet store, the index hamster, and the 
transplant recipients. This report details the animal trace-
back and the supporting laboratory investigations.
L
ymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) is a ro-
dentborne arenavirus endemic in house mice (Mus 
musculus) worldwide (1–3). Lymphocytic choriomeningi-
tis (LCM) in immunocompetent persons usually is a mild, 
self-limited, viral syndrome or is asymptomatic; aseptic 
meningitis also can occur, but the infection is rarely fatal 
(4–6). In immunocompromised persons, LCM may result 
in serious systemic infections and death. LCM during preg-
nancy can cause spontaneous abortion or severe birth de-
fects, including hydrocephalus, chorioretinitis, blindness, 
or psychomotor retardation (7). Congenital LCMV infec-
tion is likely greatly underreported as a cause of poor preg-
nancy outcomes (7). Human infection occurs most com-
monly through exposure (by direct contact or inhalation of 
infectious aerosol) to secretions or excretions of infected 
animals (8). To our knowledge, person-to-person transmis-
sion has not been reported, except for transmission from 
mother to fetus (7) and 1 previous cluster in December 
2003 of infection through organ transplantation (9,10).
In early April 2005, 4 recipients of solid-organ trans-
plants in 3 hospitals in Rhode Island and Massachusetts 
became gravely ill shortly after transplantation; 3 subse-
quently died (10). All 4 recipients shared a common donor. 
Tissue and blood samples from the donor and recipients 
were sent from the Rhode Island Department of Health 
and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where 
LCMV was identiﬁ  ed as the etiologic agent (10). Viral se-
quences from the organ recipients were identical to those 
from a pet hamster acquired by the donor’s household 17 
days before organ donation (10). Here we report the results 
of an epidemiologic and environmental investigation to 




Thorough epidemiologic investigations were con-
ducted at the Rhode Island pet store where the index 
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hamster was purchased, the Ohio distribution facility that 
supplied the pet store, and the primary breeding facility in 
Arkansas. These investigations focused on interviews; re-
view of invoices, shipping records, and US Department of 
Agriculture inspection reports; and on-site environmental 
assessments.
Rodent Sample Collection
All available rodent species known to be competent 
hosts for LCMV (capable of becoming chronically infected 
and shedding virus for up to 9 months) (6,11,12) were col-
lected from the remaining rodent stock at the Rhode Island 
pet store. These species included Syrian hamsters (Mesocri-
cetus auratus), “fancy” mice (M. musculus), and guinea 
pigs (Cavia porcellus). Although they have not been shown 
to be competent reservoirs for LCMV, “fancy” rats (Rattus 
norvegicus) and gerbils (Meriones unguiculatus) also were 
sampled because of their exposure to the infected rodents. 
Rodents were sampled and euthanized following approved 
CDC Animal Care and Use Committee protocols.
With a known population size and a LCMV prevalence 
estimate, the hypergeometric probability distribution was 
used to determine the minimum sample size needed to pro-
vide a 95% chance of detecting at least 1 LCMV infected 
rodent at each site. The LCMV prevalence was estimated 
to be 4.7% in Ohio and 4.3% in Arkansas. The Ohio preva-
lence was based on 4 infected of 85 tested at the Rhode 
Island pet store; the revised prevalence for Arkansas was 
based on 9 of 211 positives after data from the Ohio sam-
ples were incorporated. 
The population sizes (Table 1) included only dwarf 
hamsters and did not distinguish between the Chinese 
and Roborovsky dwarf hamsters (Cricetulus curtatus and 
Phodopus roborovskii, respectively). An agreement was 
reached with the owner in which ≈10% of the total popu-
lation of 140 Roborovsky’s dwarf hamsters was sampled. 
In this case, the probability of detecting at least 1 positive 
rodent was 36.5%.
Laboratory Investigation
The index hamster, the organ recipients, the animals 
from the pet store, and rodents from the Ohio and Arkansas 
facilities were tested for LCMV with a combination of as-
says that included serology, immunohistochemistry (IHC), 
reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR), TaqMan (Applied 
Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA), and virus isolation. 
Genetic sequences obtained from the respective samples 
were used in the phylogenetic analysis to identify the 
LCMV strain and epidemiologic link leading to transplant-
associated deaths.
Virus Isolation
Virus isolation was conducted by using Vero E-6 cells. 
For blood or serum, 100 μL of sample was used as inocu-
lum. For tissues, a 10% cell suspension was prepared in a 
viral support medium (Hank’s balanced salt solution with 
5% heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum) and clariﬁ  ed by 
centrifugation. A100-μL aliquot of the supernatant ﬂ  uid 
was used as the inoculum. Flasks were incubated for 1 
hour, fed with maintenance medium, and observed for 2 
weeks. Cells from ﬂ  asks were tested for replicating LCMV 
by immunoﬂ  uorescent antibody assay (IFA) on 1 of days 
4–7 (depending on supplemental information made avail-
able through other testing) and again on day 14. If no reac-
tivity was detected by IFA from days 4 to 7 or on day 14, 
the ﬂ  ask was considered negative for virus.
Molecular Detection of LCMV in Rodents
Highly sensitive real-time RT-PCR TaqMan assay 
was performed as described previously (10). RNA isolated 
from rodent blood, serum specimens, or tissue was sub-
jected to TaqMan real-time assay, and samples with cycle 
threshold (Ct) values <40 were scored as LCMV-positive. 
TaqMan-positive specimens were further analyzed by tra-
ditional RT-PCR to produce a 232-nt product within the 
RNA polymerase (L) gene and sequences were obtained by 
using previously described primers (10). The sequences of 
LCMV from the transplant recipients, index hamster, and 
rodents from the Rhode Island pet store and Ohio distri-
bution center were then compared with those obtained for 
other characterized LCMV strains by using GCG Version 
11.1.1 (Accelrys, San Diego, CA, USA) and PAUP (Sinauer 
Associates Inc., Sunderland, MA, USA). Further evidence 
of a genetic link between LCMV detected in the rodents 
and the human cases investigated was obtained by analyz-
ing the viral S RNA segment. A 611-nt S segment PCR 
Table 1. Estimated population sizes and samples taken from 2 rodent distribution facilities 
Location Species Population size
Projected
prevalence, %  Sample size 
Probability of detecting 
a positive, % 
Ohio Syrian hamsters  5,000 5.0 116 99.8
Arkansas Fancy rats >10,000 3.4 125 98.7
Arkansas Fancy mice 200 3.4 75 96.5
Arkansas Gerbils 2,500 3.4 125 98.8
Arkansas Dwarf hamsters  3,750 3.4 113* 98.1
Arkansas Roborovsky dwarf hamster  140 3.4 12† 36.5
*Sample size after removal of 12 Roborovsky hamsters from requested sample size. 
†Sample size represents an agreed-upon portion of the total population. Rodents and Fatal Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis
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product was ampliﬁ  ed by using 1-step RT-PCR protocols 
with a generic primer set (13) capable of amplifying Old 
World arenaviruses including LCMV. The 1-step RT-PCR 
was carried out by using the SuperScript III One-Step RT-
PCR System with Platinum Taq High Fidelity as described 
by the manufacturer (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA).
Serologic and Immunohistochemical 
Detection of LCMV in Rodents
An ELISA was used to evaluate serum samples col-
lected from rodents for immunoglobulin class G (IgG) 
antibodies that reacted with LCMV antigens produced in 
Vero E-6 cells. The assay was run as described in Fischer 
et al. (10), except that a protein A/protein G conjugate (Im-
munopure, Pierce Biotechnology Inc., Rockford, IL, USA) 
was used. A subset of the samples was also tested by IFA, 
using infected Vero E-6 cells. Immunohistochemical tests 
were carried out on a variety of tissues from the index ham-
ster (blood, adrenal gland, salivary gland, pancreas, liver, 
spleen, kidney, lung, heart, bone marrow, cerebrum, cer-
ebellum, brain stem, spinal cord) as previously described 
by Fischer et al. (10).
Results
Rhode Island Traceback Investigation
Physical inspection of the pet store where the donor’s 
hamster was purchased produced no evidence of wild rodent 
infestation. The store maintained live-capture traps in areas 
likely to harbor rodents (e.g., near feed bags); the trapping 
log showed no captures in the preceding 3 months.
Although other rodents had been housed in the same 
area of the pet store with the index hamster, detailed re-
cords were not available and these speciﬁ  c rodents were not 
identiﬁ  ed. Invoices dated from February through March 
2005 conﬁ  rmed that all rodents sold at the pet store had 
come from the Ohio facility.
Biosecurity in the store was limited, with opportunity 
for interspeciﬁ  c and intraspeciﬁ  c cross-infection, particu-
larly due to a lack of employee hand hygiene between han-
dling of individual rodents. As a precautionary measure, 
all rodents were quarantined at the store and further sales 
were prohibited by the Rhode Island Department of Health 
after LCMV was identiﬁ  ed in the organ recipients and the 
index hamster.
A total of 85 animals (55 hamsters, 8 guinea pigs, 10 
mice, 7 gerbils, and 5 rats) were sampled from the remain-
ing quarantined rodent stock at the Rhode Island pet store. 
Of these, 1 guinea pig and 2 hamsters were found posi-
tive for LCMV by several methods (Table 2). LCMV anti-
bodies were detected in 1 hamster by IFA, but not ELISA. 
LCMV isolates were obtained from either blood or kidney 
and immunohistochemical stains were positive in at least 1 
organ in each of the 3 rodents. All 3 rodents were positive 
for LCMV RNA with the L-gene–speciﬁ  c TaqMan primer/
probe set. The L-gene sequences obtained from these ro-
dents were identical to one another and differed from the 
index hamster and transplant recipients by only 1 nt (Fig-
ure, panel A). Further evidence conﬁ  rming the presence 
of viruses of the same genetic lineage in this episode was 
gathered by RT-PCR ampliﬁ  cation of a product from the 
S segment. The 611-nt S segment sequences of the index 
hamster and the transplant recipients were 100% identical, 
thereby reconﬁ   rming the previously established genetic 
link (10). In addition, the S segment sequences obtained 
from the 2 Rhode Island pet store hamsters were identical, 
and they differed by only 2 nt from the guinea pig sequence 
(Figure, panel B). These results indicate the same LCMV 
virus strain was present in the hamsters and guinea pig in 
the Rhode Island pet store.
Ohio Traceback Investigation
The Ohio facility served as a distribution/staging area 
for rodents destined for sale in the northeastern United 
States. Records indicated that it received most of its ham-
sters from its parent breeding facility in Arkansas. Both fa-
cilities, owned by the person, routinely received shipments 
of rodents from smaller breeders. The Arkansas facility 
Table 2. Results of laboratory testing on the index hamster and traceback rodents associated with organ transplantation transmission
of LCMV*






(L gene), bp 
Index hamster  ND Neg Pos Pos Pos 232
Pet store hamster 1  Pos Neg Pos Pos Pos 232
Pet store hamster 2  Neg Neg Pos Pos Pos 232
Pet store guinea pig 1  ND Neg Pos Pos Pos 232
Ohio hamster 1  Pos Neg Pos Pos Pos 232
Ohio Hamster 2  Pos Neg Pos Pos Pos NA
Ohio hamster 3  Pos Neg ND Neg Neg NA
Ohio hamster 4  Neg Neg Pos Pos Pos NA
Ohio hamster 5  Neg Neg Neg ND Pos NA
*LCMV, lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus; IFA, immunofluorescent antibody assay; IHC, immunohistochemistry; RT-PCR, reverse transcription–PCR; 
ND, no data; Neg, negative; Pos, positive; NA, no amplification (could not get traditional PCR primers to amplify for sequencing). 
†The table includes only those rodents that tested positive with  1 test. RESEARCH
722  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 5, May 2007
was the largest distributor in North America, with sales to 
many states.
Breeding operations at the Ohio facility had been sus-
pended in February 2005 by order of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) for multiple violations 
of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) (14); the suspension 
included all rodent species other than mice and rats. In-
terviews and a review of prior USDA facility inspection 
records indicated ongoing AWA violations and poor bio-
security practices: escaped mice and wild Mus spp. that 
entered the facility were routinely captured and added to 
captive breeding populations; sick rodents shared common 
airspace with healthy rodents, attending veterinary services 
were sporadic, rodents were shipped to Ohio without nec-
essary permits and veterinary inspections, and rodents from 
different sources shared cages for breeding purposes with-
out adequate quarantine practices.
With the assistance of the Ohio Departments of Agri-
culture and Health, the Ohio facility was quarantined and 
inspected on July 18, 2005. During this inspection, several 
examples of poor biosecurity were found: escaped rodents 
ran free and entered other holding bins; evidence of a wild 
rodent infestation was found among the feed sacks; and 
rodents from disparate sources were housed in adjacent 
racks, with opportunity for large and small particle cross-
contamination.
Shipping records were inadequately maintained, mak-
ing it difﬁ  cult to accurately account for the individual ship-
ments of rodents. However, hamsters arriving at the Ohio 
facility from either Arkansas or other outside breeders were 
placed in tubs labeled with the location of origin and the 
date of arrival. According to employees at the facility, these 
hamsters were not mixed with other shipments.
A sample of 126 rodents (116 hamsters, 9 mice, and 
1 guinea pig) was collected. This total comprised the sta-
tistically necessary 75 (taken from the general population) 
plus escaped, sick, and dead rodents. Of the specimens ex-
amined, 5 hamsters were positive for LCMV by at least 
1 method (Table 2): 3 were positive by IFA, but not by 
ELISA. Three were positive by IHC; these same 3 were 
LCMV RNA–positive as evidenced by L-segment–speciﬁ  c 
TaqMan assay. Virus was isolated from kidney tissues of 
these 3 hamsters, and sequences were obtained from 1 vi-
rus isolate. L-segment sequence comparison of the Ohio 
specimen found exact identity to the Rhode Island pet store 
hamster virus (Figure, panel A). Additionally, sequences 
obtained from the 611-nt S segment of the Ohio hamster 
differed by only 3 nt from the index hamster sequence, thus 
showing 99.5% identity (Figure, panel B). These sequences 
were compared to sequences from other previously identi-
ﬁ  ed LCMV strains such as the laboratory strains LCMV-
Armstrong and WE, and other isolates from clinical mate-
rial (Table 3). Differences in L-segment sequences in the 
viruses from the index hamster and pet store/distribution 
center rodents were <0.5%, while LCMV-Armstrong and 
WE differed by 18.1% and 13.4%, respectively. Compari-
son of the S-segment sequences between the index hamster 
and pet store/distribution center viruses showed <1% dif-
ference. LCMV-Armstrong and WE differed by 14.1% and 
14.7%, respectively, from the index hamster virus.
Figure. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) phylogenetic 
analysis of L- and S-segment sequence differences. A) Maximum 
likelihood analysis of a 232-nt fragment of the L segment was 
completed, and bootstrap numbers were generated based on 
analysis of 500 replicates. The graphic representation was 
outgrouped to the California (CA) LCMV sequence. GenBank nos. 
for the included sequence are as follows: Rhode Island (RI) and Ohio 
(OH) transplant recipients strain 200501927 (DQ182703), Rhode 
Island pet store and Ohio distributor rodents strain 200504261 
(DQ888889), New York (NY) strain WE (AF004519), Wisconsin 
(WI) transplant recipients strain 810362 (DQ182706), Missouri (MO) 
strain Armstrong (J04331), and the CA congenital infection strain 
810366 (DQ182707). B) Maximum likelihood analysis of a 611-nt 
fragment of the S segment NP gene was completed as mentioned 
above. The GenBank nos. are as follows: RI and OH transplant 
recipients strain 200501927 (DQ888890), RI pet store guinea 
pig strain 200502048 (DQ888891),OH distributor hamster strain 
200504261 (DQ888893),RI pet store hamsters strain 200501966 
(DQ888892), NY strain WE (M22138), WI transplant recipient strain 
810362 (DQ182704), MO strain Armstrong (NC_004294), and the 
CA congenital infection strain 810366 (DQ182705).Rodents and Fatal Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis
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Arkansas Traceback Investigation
Several attempts were made to sample the rodents in 
the Arkansas facility. The initial sample was to include only 
Syrian hamsters and guinea pigs, but these species were de-
stroyed by the owner when LCMV was found in the Ohio 
facility. Other remaining rodent species were then sampled 
as a proxy measure. With the assistance of the Arkansas 
Department of Health, 450 rodents were sampled, includ-
ing 125 fancy rats, 125 gerbils, 75 fancy mice, 113 Chinese 
dwarf hamsters, and 12 Roborovski dwarf hamsters. One 
fancy rat was IgG positive for LCMV by ELISA. All other 
test results, including virus isolation, were negative.
Discussion
This report documents the animal traceback investiga-
tion that linked a major pet rodent distribution operation to 
the recent outbreak of lymphocytic choriomeningitis in 4 
organ transplant recipients in Rhode Island and Massachu-
setts. This investigation demonstrates the ways in which 
classic epidemiology, laboratory diagnostics, and molecu-
lar biology can complement one another in the investiga-
tion of disease clusters. LCMV was not found in the organ 
donor’s tissues; however, the viral isolate from the pet store 
hamster was sequenced and matched to the sequences of 
the isolates from the recipients (10). The near-complete se-
quence match between the virus found in the index hamster 
and the virus sequenced from the Ohio hamster indicates 
that the genotypes share a common lineage that is dis-
tinct from previously identiﬁ  ed strains. It is unlikely that 
this genotype would be as similar to a genotype found in 
wild house mice in Rhode Island. Thus, the animal trace-
back, coupled with the molecular phylogenetic evidence, 
supports the hypothesis that the index hamster’s infection 
came from the rodent distribution center in Ohio, rather 
than from wild M. musculus populations around the home 
of the donor or pet store.
Sequence and phylogenetic data provided strong sup-
port for the presence of the same LCMV lineage in ham-
sters and guinea pigs in the Rhode Island pet store and the 
Ohio distribution center and established the epidemiologic 
link of that particular lineage of LCMV to transplant-as-
sociated deaths. Comparison of LCMV genotypes obtained 
from this investigation with previously identiﬁ  ed strains 
LCMV-Armstrong and WE and other isolates from clini-
cal material found considerable differences (Figure, Table 
3). While the differences in S-segment sequences between 
the index hamster and pet store/distribution center viruses 
were <1% (<3-nt difference), LCMV-Armstrong and WE 
differed from index hamster sequences by 14.1% (76-nt 
difference) and 14.7% (86-nt difference), respectively. 
Similarly, the differences in L-segment sequences in the 
viruses from the index hamster and pet store/distribution 
center rodents were <0.5% (3-nt difference), while LCMV-
Armstrong and WE differed by 18.1% and 13.4% (41 nt 
and 30 nt), respectively. These analyses indicate an overall 
close identity among LCMV strains implicated in this in-
vestigation, and wide differences from previously published 
sequences of strains Armstrong and WE. This molecular 
evidence corroborates the epidemiologic data implicating 
LCMV transmission within the commercial pet trade.
After the identiﬁ  cation of LCMV in the Ohio facility, 
all states that had received animals from this facility in the 
previous 5 months were notiﬁ  ed. Many potentially infected 
animals still remained in stores; their disposition was deter-
Table 3. Comparison of nucleotide identity differences among LCMV strains and isolates* 
State/sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Rhode Island 
 Lung  recipient  1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 13.4 15.8 18.1 22.9
 Liver  recipient  2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 13.4 15.8 18.1 22.9
 Kidney  recipient  A  3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 13.4 15.8 18.1 22.9
 Kidney  recipient  B  4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 13.4 15.8 18.1 22.9
 Donor's  hamster  5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 13.4 15.8 18.1 22.9
  Pet store hamster 1 6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 15.3 18.5 23.4
  Pet store hamster 2 7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 15.3 18.5 23.4
  Pet store guinea pig 8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 12.9 15.3 18.5 23.4
Ohio 
  Distributor hamster 9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 12.9 15.3 18.5 23.4
New York 
 WE  10 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.1 12.1 12.3 12.3 16.2 18.5 24.1
Wisconsin 
  Kidney recipients 11 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.2 14.4 14.6 19.5 22.5
Missouri 
 Armstrong  12 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 13.7 13.7 13.9 14.1 15.2 13.7 21.7
California
  Congenital infection 13 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.4 14.4 14.6 14.7 13.3 14.6 14.4
*LCMV, lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus. The percentage of differences for each pair of sequences was calculated with PAUP as uncorrected 
distances. Values on the upper diagonal represent differences in the L fragment (232 nt) and values on the lower diagonal represent differences on the 
S fragment (611 nt). RESEARCH
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mined by individual states. Actions taken ranged from sale 
or adoption with an information leaﬂ  et or informed consent 
to issuing stop sale orders on speciﬁ  c rodent species from 
the Ohio facility.
Upon notiﬁ  cation of the Ohio sample test results, the 
Ohio Department of Agriculture informed the proprietor of 
the LCMV contamination in his facility and requested that 
a written plan for decontaminating the facility and a sec-
ond plan for keeping the facility LCMV-free in the future 
be provided. The proprietor responded by depopulating the 
Ohio facility. The quarantine was lifted after the building 
was disinfected, but the facility was never reopened.
A direct link between the Arkansas and Ohio facili-
ties was established by the discovery of the marked tubs 
in Ohio. This enabled the Arkansas Departments of Health 
and Agriculture (Livestock and Poultry) to issue a Joint 
Quarantine and Inspection Order. However, several days 
after depopulating the Ohio facility, the proprietor also de-
stroyed all the Syrian hamsters and guinea pigs at the Ar-
kansas facility. Although efforts were made to sample the 
remaining rodents at the Arkansas facility in an attempt to 
pinpoint the source of the virus found in Ohio, the owner 
refused to allow access to the rodents on several occasions 
and >4 months elapsed between the initial and the ultimate-
ly successful attempts to conduct sampling. Virus isolation 
on all samples was unsuccessful.
Several factors may have contributed to the lack of vi-
rus in the Arkansas breeding facility, including the follow-
ing: 1) the virus was never there, 2) the destruction of the 
Syrian hamsters and guinea pigs eliminated the virus from 
the facility, 3) the elapsed time allowed for the removal 
of infected animals and subsequent decontamination of the 
facility, and 4) a complete replacement of the rodent stock 
was accomplished within the facility. Although the facility 
was under quarantine for 3 of the 4 months between the ﬁ  rst 
and last attempts at sampling, only sporadic surveillance of 
the facility was carried out by a governmental authority. 
Elimination of the virus from the population did not likely 
occur naturally because LCMV can chronically infect mice 
and will lead to persistent colonial transmission (6,11).
Since the time of our investigation, the proprietor’s 
license has been suspended by the USDA for 5 years for 
violations of the AWA unrelated to this investigation. The 
Rhode Island pet retailer who sold the index hamster report-
edly ceased business relations with the distributor shortly 
after the infection was linked to his facilities.
To our knowledge, the Rhode Island outbreak repre-
sents the ﬁ  rst documented case of fatal LCMV infection 
involving a pet animal (10). In the previous cluster of trans-
plant-related LCMV deaths, no rodent exposure was identi-
ﬁ  ed (9). Several rodent species that are sold as pets, includ-
ing hamsters, mice, and guinea pigs, can be incidental hosts 
of LCMV. These species become infected through contact 
with infected wild mice, and can pass the infection to hu-
mans. Most human LCMV infections are associated with 
exposure to wild house mice (6,15); however, several out-
breaks have been attributed to laboratory and pet mice and 
hamsters (5,6,16,17). One example is the 1974 outbreak 
associated with pet hamsters sold by a single distributor. A 
total of 181 symptomatic cases (46 requiring hospitaliza-
tion) in persons with hamster contact were identiﬁ  ed in 12 
states; no deaths occurred (5). The outbreak was brought 
under control by voluntary cessation of sale and destruction 
of the infected breeding stock.
Prevention
LCMV surveillance should be a primary concern in the 
pet rodent industry to avoid entry of this virus into pet trade 
populations. Because of the ubiquitous distribution of the 
house mouse, eliminating the natural reservoir of LCMV 
is not practical. Steps can be taken, however, to exclude 
wild house mice from homes and businesses. Immunocom-
promised persons and pregnant women should be advised 
to avoid close contact with all rodents and infested areas. 
Educational materials should address the risk from expo-
sure to wild mice as well as pet rodents. The virus is not 
naturally present in pet rodent species and the ease of trans-
mission of the virus from pet rodents to humans may be 
greater than from wild mice when one considers the nature 
of the relationship between pet rodents and their owners 
(i.e., close physical contact). Therefore, every effort should 
be made to eliminate the virus from pet populations when 
it is discovered.
LCMV is already actively excluded from laboratory 
rodent populations, because the infection can be an occu-
pational hazard to laboratory workers who work around 
infected rodents (5), and because inapparent infection can 
interfere with experimental results in rodent studies (18). 
Economic considerations may prohibit such rigorous bi-
osecurity measures like those used for laboratory animals; 
however, sentinel surveillance (19), adequate veterinary 
care, exclusion of wild rodents (20), and good infection 
control practices can substantially reduce the opportu-
nity for introduction and spread of LCMV and other pet 
rodent pathogens in commercial pet populations. Efforts 
to increase such practices within the pet trade are under 
way. Adherence to regulations that are already in place for 
obtaining permits and veterinary inspection of commercial 
rodent populations can also reduce the likelihood of infec-
tion and improve animal welfare.
Further efforts to reduce risk for LCM in pet owners are 
ongoing. Education is critical in preventing LCM and other 
pet-related infections. Potential pet owners should choose 
pets appropriate to their household (21). Pregnant women 
and immunocompromised persons should avoid pet rodents 
altogether (22). Additionally, pet owners should be advised Rodents and Fatal Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis
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of the possibility of acquiring zoonotic diseases from any 
pet and of precautions that should be taken to prevent ac-
quiring pet-related infections such as LCM, tularemia (23), 
salmonellosis (24), and others. Persons can reduce risk for 
infection from pet rodents by being attentive to proper hand 
hygiene and environmental cleaning. Additional informa-
tion on LCMV is available from the CDC website (25).
Acknowledgments
We wish to acknowledge the following persons and agen-
cies for their contributions to this investigation: James Mills, 
Herminia Alva, Archer Miller, Thomas Stevens, Michael Bell, 
Joel Montgomery, Mitesh Patel, Jeannette Guarner, Kimberly 
Slaughter, Deborah Cannon, Rita Helfand, Joe Foster, Heather 
Horton; Frank Wilson, Altino McKelvey, Randy Owens, Sherry 
Langley, Joe Bates, Rick Hogan, Reggie Rogers, Gail Kusturin, 
and other staff in the Arkansas Department of Health and Hu-
man Services; Jeff Hayes, David Frew, and other staff in the Ohio 
Departments of Agriculture and Health; Bernadette Juarez, Clara 
Markin, Randy Coleman, Carl LaLonde, Betty Goldentyer, and 
additional staff in the US Department of Agriculture Animal and 
Plant Inspection Service.
Dr Amman is a mammalogist for the Special Pathogens 
Branch at CDC in Atlanta, Georgia. His research interests include 
investigating the ecology of, and relationships between, emerging 
viruses and their mammalian reservoirs.
References
  1.   Childs JE, Glass GE, Ksiazek TG, Rossi CA, Oro JG, LeDuc JW. 
Human-rodent contact and infection with lymphocytic choriomen-
ingitis and Seoul viruses in an inner-city population. Am J Trop Med 
Hyg. 1991;44:117–21.
  2.   Childs JE, Glass GE, Korch GW, Ksiazek TG, LeDuc JW. Lym-
phocytic choriomeningitis virus infection and house mouse (Mus 
musculus) distribution in urban Baltimore. Am J Trop Med Hyg. 
1992;47:27–34.
  3.   Park JY, Peters CJ, Rollin PE, Ksiazek TG, Katholi CR, Waites KB, 
et al. Age distribution of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus serum 
antibody in Birmingham, Alabama: evidence of a decreased risk of 
infection. Am J Trop Med Hyg. 1997;57:37–41.
  4.   Lewis AM Jr, Rowe WP, Turner HC, Huebner RJ. Lymphocytic-
choriomeningitis virus in hamster tumor: spread to hamsters and 
humans. Science. 1965;150:363–4.
  5.   Gregg MB. Recent outbreaks of lymphocytic choriomeningitis in the 
United States of America. Bull World Health Organ. 1975;52:549–
53.
  6.   Rousseau MC, Saron MF, Brouqui P, Bourgeade A. Lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis virus in southern France: four case reports and a 
review of the literature. Eur J Epidemiol. 1997;13:817–23.
  7.   Barton LL, Mets MB, Beauchamp CL. Lymphocytic choriomen-
ingitis virus: emerging fetal teratogen. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 
2002;187:1715–6.
  8.   Richmond JY, McKinney RW, editors. Biosafety in microbiological 
and biomedical laboratories. 4th ed. Washington: US Government 
Printing Ofﬁ  ce; 1999.
  9.   Paddock C, Ksiazek T, Comer JA, Rollin P, Nichol S, Shieh WJ, et 
al. Pathology of fatal lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infection 
in multiple organ transplant recipients from a common donor. Mod-
ern Pathology. 2005;18(Suppl 1):263A–4A.
10.   Fischer SA, Graham MB, Kuehnert MJ, Kotton CN, Srinivasan A, 
Marty FM, et al. Transmission of lymphocytic choriomeningitis vi-
rus via organ transplantation. N Engl J Med. 2006;354:2235–49.
11.    Traub E. The epidemiology of lymphocytic choriomeningitis in 
white mice. J Exp Med. 1936;64:183–200.
12.   Lehmann-Grube F. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus. New York: 
Springer-Verlag; 1971.
13.   Bowen MD, Rollin P, Ksiazek TG, Hustad HL, Bausch DG, Dem-
byet AH, et al. Genetic diversity among Lassa virus strains. J Virol. 
2000;74:6992–7004.
14.   Animal Welfare Act 1990 (7 USC, 2131–2156). Beltsville (MD): 
US Department of Agriculture Animal Welfare Information Center. 
[cited 2006 June 1]. Available from http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/
legislat/awa.htm
15.   Childs JE, Peters CJ. Ecology and epidemiology of arenaviruses and 
their hosts. In: Salvo MS, editor. The Arenaviridae. New York: Ple-
num Press; 1993. p. 331–84.
16.   Baum SG, Lewis AM, Rowe WP, Huebner RJ. Epidemic nonmen-
ingitic lymphocytic-choriomeningitis-virus infection: an outbreak 
in a population of laboratory personnel. N Engl J Med. 1966;274: 
934–6.
17.   Ackermann R, Stille W, Blumenthal K. Syrische hamster als unber-
trager von lymphozytärer choriomeningitis. Dtsch Med Wochenschr. 
1972;97:1725–31.
18.    Nicklas W, Homberger FR, Illgen-Wilcke B, Jacobi K, Kraft V, 
Kunstyr I, et al. Implications of infectious agents on results of ani-
mal experiments. Report of the Working Group on Hygiene of the 
Gesellschaft fur Versuchstierkunde–Society for Laboratory Animal 
Science (GV-SOLAS). Lab Anim. 1999;33(Suppl 1):S39–87.
19.   Lipman NS, Homberger FR. Rodent quality assurance testing: use of 
sentinel animal systems. Lab Animal. 2003;32:36–43.
20.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Rodent control: seal up! 
Trap up! Clean up! [cited 2006 June 1]. Available from http://www.
cdc.gov/rodents
21.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Healthy pets, healthy 
people. [cited 2006 June 1]. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/
healthypets
22.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: interim guid-
ance for minimizing risk for human lymphocytic choriomeningitis 
virus infection associated with pet rodents. MMWR Morb Mortal 
Wkly Rep. 2005;54:799–801.
23.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Brief report: tularemia 
associated with a hamster bite—Colorado, 2004. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep. 2005;53:1202–3.
24.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreak of multidrug-
resistant  Salmonella Typhimurium associated with rodents pur-
chased at retail pet stores—United States, December 2003–October 
2004. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2005;54:429–33.
25.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Lymphocytic chorio-
meningitis (LCMV). [cited 2006 June 1]. Available from http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/lcmv.htm
Address for correspondence: Brian R. Amman, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Mailstop A26, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; email: 
bamman@cdc.gov
Use of trade names is for identiﬁ  cation only and does not imply 
endorsement by the Public Health Service or by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.